Here's how I've implemented digital minimalism into one of my phones to give you all an idea of how I keep my technology simple, focused, minimal, and working for me. NextDNS Affiliate Link: https://nextdns.io/?from=5v4be7mt NextDNS Standard Link: https://nextdns.io/ How To Clear Homescreen: https://www.idownloadblog.com/2022/02/21/how-to-create-iphone-home-screen-with-no-apps/ Punkt Review That Inspired This Video: https://youtu.be/QdYrBpBJRI4 🔐 Our Website: https://techlore.tech 🕵 Go Incognito Course - to learn about privacy: https://techlore.tech/goincognito 🏫 Techlore Coaching - to get direct support: https://techlore.tech/coaching 💻 Techlore Forum - to connect with other advocates: https://discuss.techlore.tech 🦣 Mastodon - to stay updated: https://social.lol/@techlore We cannot provide our content without our Patrons, huge thanks to: Afonso, Boori, BRIGHTSIDE, Casper, Clark, Cyclops, Eldarix, JohnnyO, Jon, kevin, Larry, love your content, NotSure, Poaclu, x 🧡 Join them on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/techlore 💚 To see our production gear, privacy tools we use, and other affiliates: https://techlore.tech/affiliates 💖 All Techlore Support Methods: https://techlore.tech/support 00:00 Intro to digital minimalism 00:50 Phone choices 01:52 Delete unused applications 02:37 Clean your homescreen 04:32 Changing your navigation 06:48 Screentime/downtime and other controls 08:22 DNS Filtering 09:46 The little things 11:10 The mentality 13:02 Summarizing things #minimal #minimalist #techlore
Looking for an answer more detailed than just switch to pixel and use graphene or calyx.
What are the recommended changes to use in the Settings App to make Apple more secure and private?
Should I just use the Safari browser due to all the browsers being the same as they all use WebKit
I’m looking for suggested changes to staying minimal but increasing privacy and security on iPhone
E2E refers to data in transit: the data will be encrypted between its source and destination. It says nothing about how that data is protected once it has arrived.
E2E iCloud means a third party won’t be able to snoop on the data while you are reading from iCloud or writing to iCloud. But Apple employees can still log into your account and decrypt the data at rest on iCloud in many circumstances because the data at rest is encrypted against a key held by Apple.
A recent example of how this can go wrong was seen with Azure (which hosts some of iCloud) where a Microsoft dev key leaked and attackers were able to use it to generate a working decryption key for the US Government Azure service (a different product) and read terabytes of government data off the cloud services.
The attackers could have targeted iCloud hosting services instead of the US government and done the same thing for all data in all iCloud accounts not specifically encrypted against a personal key held only in your personal keychain.
And if you use iCloud Keychain of course, the same technique can be used to attack your keychain by pretending to be Apple Support and “recover” the contents of the keychain.
According to Apple they do not have the keys when you enable Advanced Data Protection, which is why they force you to have your own backup recovery methods (recovery key, recovery contacts). When they talk about E2E the endpoints they are referring to are user-owned devices.
iCloud Keychain recovery is also much more complex than you are describing.
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E2E refers to data in transit: the data will be encrypted between its source and destination. It says nothing about how that data is protected once it has arrived.
E2E iCloud means a third party won’t be able to snoop on the data while you are reading from iCloud or writing to iCloud. But Apple employees can still log into your account and decrypt the data at rest on iCloud in many circumstances because the data at rest is encrypted against a key held by Apple.
A recent example of how this can go wrong was seen with Azure (which hosts some of iCloud) where a Microsoft dev key leaked and attackers were able to use it to generate a working decryption key for the US Government Azure service (a different product) and read terabytes of government data off the cloud services.
The attackers could have targeted iCloud hosting services instead of the US government and done the same thing for all data in all iCloud accounts not specifically encrypted against a personal key held only in your personal keychain.
And if you use iCloud Keychain of course, the same technique can be used to attack your keychain by pretending to be Apple Support and “recover” the contents of the keychain.
According to Apple they do not have the keys when you enable Advanced Data Protection, which is why they force you to have your own backup recovery methods (recovery key, recovery contacts). When they talk about E2E the endpoints they are referring to are user-owned devices.
iCloud Keychain recovery is also much more complex than you are describing.